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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Nor were the attorneys hired by the defendant employed solely in its
affairs, since they were also acting on behalf of its customers.2 7
It appears that the Court in the instant case has unduly extended
the status of the law concerning unauthorized practice by its too
liberal interpretation of statutory and judicial authority.28 This posi-
tion is not substantiated by the policies of other states, and a more
restricted application of such statutes is desirable for the protection
of the public, the bar, and the courts.2 9
M
TAXATION-NEw YORK CITY PROPERTY TRANSFER TAX HELD
INAPPLICABLE TO DEEDS DELIVERED OUTSIDE CITY. - Plaintiff-
grantor executed, acknowledged and delivered real property located
within the City of New York. Under protest the plaintiff paid a
tax levied on the deed by which his real property was conveyed as
required by the Real Property Transfer Tax law.' Plaintiff alleged
that he was entitled to a refund since the transaction was consum-
mated outside the territorial limits of the City of New York. The
Court held that he was entitled to a refund and that the Real Prop-
erty Transfer Tax law is invalid to the extent that it purports to tax
a deed delivered outside the city limits. Realty Equities Corp. v.
Gerosa, 142 N.Y.L.J. 11 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
The Real Property Transfer Tax law imposes a tax on a deed
regardless of where made, executed or delivered, whereby any real
27 Thus an interesting problem of conflict of interests arises. Canon 6 of
the Canons of Professional Ethics provides that "it is unprofessional to rep-
resent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all concerned given
after a full disclosure of the facts." (Emphasis added.) And in People v.
Peoples Trust Co., 180 App. Div. 494, 167 N.Y. Supp. 767 (2d Dep't 1917),
the court indicates that §280 of the Penal Law was specifically enacted to
avoid a conflict of interests. It explains: "The relation between attorney
and client is confidential in the extreme. The attorney . . . owes undivided
loyalty to his client, unhampered by obligations to any other employer ....
It is obvious that the intervention of a corporation, the general employer of
an attorney, between him and his client, is destructive of this necessary and
important relation." Id. at 496, 167 N.Y. Supp. at 768.
28 The Standing Committee on Unauthorized Practice of Law (American
Bar Association) has registered its violent disapproval of the ruling in this
case, contenting itself with the possibility that it "appears to be limited to the
particular facts of the case." 25 COMMITEE ON UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE
OF THE LAW, AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE NEws 203-04,
252 (1959).
29To permit a lay intermediary to be interposed between attorney and
client "would destroy the confidential relationship of attorney and client,
thwart the control of the courts over the practice of law, and irreparably
impair the sound administration of justice." Stack v. P.G. Garage, Inc.,
7 N.J. 118, 80 A.2d 545, 547 (1951).
1 N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE ANN. § 146-2.0 (Supp. 1959-60).
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property located in New York City or interest therein is conveyed.
It was enacted pursuant to authority conferred by the state's
Enabling Act 2 which provides:
this act shall not authorize the imposition of a tax on any transaction orig-
inating and/or consummated outside of the territorial limits of any city,
notwithstanding that some acts be necessarily performed with respect to such
transaction within such limits.$
The permissive scope and effect of the Real Property Transfer Tax
law must be determined within the limits prescribed by the Enabling
Act.4 Since the Enabling Act only authorizes taxation of transfers
within New York City, it is invalid to the extent that it authorizes
the taxation of transactions that are consummated outside the terri-
torial limits of the city.
Generally a transaction is consummated at that place where the
taxable event is to be performed.5 In the case of the New York City
Sales Tax,6 which was enacted on the authority of the same state
Enabling Act, the Court of Appeals held that sales requiring delivery
beyond the city limits were not consummated within New York City
and therefore were not subject to the tax.7 Similarly in the case of
the Real Property Transfer Tax law, the tax being imposed on the
deed effecting the transfer of real property, the taxable event is con-
summated at the place where the deed is delivered.8
Delivery of the deed is complete when a physical transfer and
the intention that it shall operate as a conveyance concur.2 Recorda-
tion does not affect the validity of the deed 10 and is merely an addi-
tional protection available to the grantee at his option. Thus only
those sales of real property located in New York City which are
closed in New York City are subject to the effects of the Real Prop-
erty Transfer Tax law.
2 N.Y. UNCONSoL. LAWS § 9901(1) (e) (McKinney Supp. 1959).
3 N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 9901(6) (McKinney Supp. 1959).
'See ALzEN, LAW IN THE MAKING 549-50 (6th ed. 1958); FoRxoscH,
ADMINqSnRATIVn LAW §339 (1956).
5 National Cash Register Co. v. Taylor, 252 App. Div. 90, 297 N.Y. Supp.
169 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 276 N.Y. 208, 11 N.E.2d 881 (1937).
6 N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE ANN. § N41-2.0 (1938). This ordinance imposed
a tax on receipts from sales at retail of tangible personal property sold within
the city.
7 Gunther's Sons v. McGoldrick, 279 N.Y. 148, 18 N.E.2d 12 (1938)(per curiam) ; National Cash Register Co. v. Taylor, supra note 5. The effect
of this ordinance and its interpretation was minimized by the enactment of
remedial legislation providing that the tax would be on residents who used the
goods in New York City but who purchased them outside the city. See
N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE ANN. § M41-17.0 (1949) as construed in Bee Line, Inc.
v. Joseph, 284 App. Div. 98, 103 N.Y.S.2d 437 (1st Dep't 1954).8 Realty Equities Co. v. Gerosa, 142 N.Y.L.J. 11 (Sup. Ct. 1959).9 Ten Eyck v. Whitbeck, 156 N.Y. 341, 50 N.E. 963 (1898) ; Diamond v.
Wasserman, 8 App. Div.2d 623, 185 N.Y.S.2d 411 (2d Dep't 1959).
10Lee v. Beagell, 174 Misc. 6, 19 N.Y.S.2d 613 (Sup. Ct. 1940). See
Diamond v. Wasserman, mipra note 9.
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A Philadelphia ordinance caused a similar situation by imposing
a tax on certain transactions relating to the making, execution, issu-
ance or delivery of any document." In construing this ordinance
the court held that even if it was intended to impose a tax on a
transfer, outside the city, of property within the city, such intention
was futile as being in excess of authority granted to the city by
enabling legislation which provides for the taxation of transactions,
privileges, subjects and personal property within the limits of the
city. Since the tax was on the transaction itself, those transactions
occurring outside the city were not subject to the tax.1 2  To close
this loophole, the legislature amended the ordinance by providing
that the term "deliver" should include the presentation for recording
within the City of Philadelphia of any document whereby title to or
any interest in real property located within the city was transferred
or conveyed, regardless of where the document was executed, de-
livered or accepted.13  Thus the inadequacies of the ordinance were
corrected by remedial legislation, bringing the transaction of re-
cording the deed within the scope of the taxing provision.
The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain
and give effect to the plain meaning of the statute.' 4 However, if
such a construction will produce an absurd, illogical or unjust result
or a result contrary to the policy of the legislation as a whole, the
legislative intent must be given effect.' This rule of construction
cannot be applied to the Real Property Transfer Tax law since there
is an absence of persuasive evidence of legislative intent to permit
the city to tax conveyances by deed made outside the city if they
pertain to real estate within the city.' 6
Wherever the legislative intent is indeterminable, it is the duty
of the court to give the statute a reasonable construction consistent
with general principles of law. 17 Tax statutes must be construed
most strongly against the government and in favor of the taxpayer.' 8
II See Philadelphia City Ordinance as cited in In re North American Rayon
Corp., 383 Pa. 428, 119 A.2d 205, 207 (1956).
12See In. re North American Rayon Corp., smpra note 11; City Stores Co.
v. City of Philadelphia, 376 Pa. 482, 103 A.2d 664 (1954).
"3See Philadelphia City Ordinance as cited in L.J.W. Realty Corp. v. City
of Philadelphia, 390 Pa. 197, 134 A.2d 878, 882 (1957).
14 See United Parcel Service v. Joseph, 272 App. Div. 194, 70 N.Y.S.2d 22
(1st Dep't 1947), aff'd mere., 297 N.Y. 1004, 80 N.E.2d 533 (1948) ; American
Bridge Co. v. Smith, 352 Mo. 616, 179 S.W.2d 12 (1944).
15 United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 310 U.S. 534 (1940);
United Parcel Service v. Joseph, supra, note 14.
16 See Realty Equities Corp. v. Gerosa, 142 N.Y.L.J. 11 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
'1 Saltser & Weinsier, Inc. v. McGoldrick, 295 N.Y. 499, 68 N.E.2d 508
(1946). See In re Villard's Will, 147 Misc. 472, 264 N.Y. Supp. 236 (Surr.
Ct. 1933).
18 Good Humor Corp. v. McGoldrick, 289 N.Y. 452, 46 N.E.2d 881 (1943);
United Parcel Service v. Joseph, supra note 14; Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v.
McGoldrick, 270 App. Div. 186, 59 N.Y.S.2d 243 (1st Dep't 1945), aff'd men.,
298 N.Y. 536, 80 N.E.2d 669 (1948).
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Therefore the Real Property Transfer Tax must be construed so as
to limit the authority of the city to tax only those transactions occur-
ring within New York City.
The Real Property Transfer Tax law imposes a tax on each
deed by which real property is transferred within New York City,
at a rate of one-half of one per centum of the consideration or value,
provided that an exception of twenty-five thousand dollars is allowed
on the interest or property conveyed. The effect of this tax will be
avoided by transacting realty closings outside the territorial limits of
New York City whenever possible. This will result in a burden on
the attorneys in that they will be forced to travel beyond the terri-
torial limits of the city to effectuate their closings. It will also
necessitate that a representative of the title search company travel
to the place of the closing, making an increase in the fee inevitable
because of the additional time and expense spent in traveling. All
these additional expenses and inconveniences in no way will benefit
New York City.
In view of these obvious and fatal effects, it is only reasonable
that this ordinance be repealed or in the alternative amended so as
to include recordation of the deed as the taxable event upon which
the Real Property Transfer Tax is levied.
TORTS-SUICIDE WHILE INSANE AS RESULT OF CONVERSION
HELD ACTIONABLE IN WRONGFUL DEATH.-Executrix brought this
action for wrongful death based on testator's suicide allegedly in-
duced by defendant's conversion. The defendants were diamond
dealers who refused to return or pay for a diamond consigned to
them by decedent-broker. Plaintiff claimed that this constituted a
threat to the broker's reputation, causing an irresistible impulse in
the deceased to commit suicide. Upon a motion to dismiss, the
Court held that the complaint stated a cause of action. Cauverien v.
De Metz, 188 N.Y.S.2d 627 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
Authority in the United States indicates that there can be no
recovery in wrongful death where the deceased took his own life.'
The rule denying recovery arose in the United States during the last
quarter of the nineteenth century.2 The early cases were disposed
of on the ground that the deceased's death by suicide was not the
' Scheffer v. Railroad Co., 105 U.S. 249 (1882); Salsedo v. Palmer, 278
Fed. 92 (2d Cir. 1921) ; Stevens v. Steadman, 140 Ga. 680, 79 S.E. 564 (1913);
Daniels v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 183 Mass. 393, 67 N.E. 424 (1903);
Jones v. Stewart, 183 Tenn. 176, 191 S.W.2d 439 (1946).
2 See, e.g., Scheffer v. Railroad Co., mipra note 1.
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